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NUMBER 2

Since the inception of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946,
there have been significant changes in the domestic uranium procurement program. The original program and the subsequent changes,
however, have produced surprisingly little litigation. The original Act,
its history, the changes and the litigation, or rather the lack thereof,
are discussed in this article by two Utah lawyers who have an extensive
practice in the mineral law field, including litigation.

DOMESTIC URANIUM PROCUREMENTHISTORY AND PROBLEMS
Leonard J. Lewis*
C. Keith Rooker"
HISTORY OF PROGRAM

T

iiE exploration, development and production of 'domestic
uranium deposits has, during its twenty-year life, developed into a major American industry.' The growth of this
industry has been accompanied by the evolution of rigidly
controlled programs administered by the United States
Atomic Energy Commission acting pursuant to authority conferred upon it by congressional enactment.2 The interpretation and application of the Atomic Energy Commission's
VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah;
B.S. 1947, University of Utah; LL.B. 1950, Stanford University; Member
of the Utah State Bar and the American Bar Association.
** Partner, VanCott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah;
B.A. 1958, Brigham Young University; J.D. 1961, University of Chicago;
Member of the Utah State Bar.
That part of this article dealing with the computation of royalty grew
out of the authors' participation in litigation on the subject. Thus, some
of the views presented should be regarded as those of an advocate.-Ed.
1. In the calendar year 1964, the domestic uranium industry produced 5.7
million tons of ore from about 600 mines, yielding 11,847 tons of U.O, miil
concentrate valued at nearly $190 million. U.S. DEP'T OF IN7TRIOR, MINERAL
YEARBOOK 1119 (1964). Remarks of Jessee C. Johnson, Director, Division
of Raw Materials, United States Atomic Energy Commission, before the
4th Annual Conference of the Industrial Forum at New York, New York,
October 28, 1957.
2. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2394
*Partner,
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programs governing procurement of domestically produced
uranium, and the practical operation of those programs, have,
of course, generated much concern in the industry and frequent disputes at all levels. Notwithstanding the sometimes
controversial and frequently confusing pattern of the Commission's procurement policies, there has been remarkably
little litigation.' Moreover, there has been almost no comment on the nature and effect of these policies.'
After reviewing the first twelve years' history of the
Atomic Energy Commission's domestic uranium procurement program, the editors of the Michigan Law Review in
1958 concluded that the tranquility that had attended the
program might be traced to the phenomenon of a buyer-the
Government-willing to accept a greater volume of goods
that sellers could produce. With anticipated changes in the
market situation, it was anticipated that demand for clarification of contractual relations would probably ensue.' It
has now been twenty years since the initial announcement
of the domestic uranium procurement program. Radium
Mines, Inc. v. United States6 remains the only reported 'decision interpreting language in the Government's guaranteed
price circulars. It might easily be concluded from this that
tranquility has in fact reigned in the administration of the
program, and that the program has remained unchanged during the intervening years. Such a conclusion, however, would
be erroneous, for there have been many significant changes
in the procurement program, and although the program has
not been the subject of much reported litigation, as many
anticipated it would be, serious problems affecting the pro(1964) amending Atomic Energy Act of 1946, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
3. Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, 139 Ct.Cl. 144, 153 F. Supp. 403
(1957), appears to be the only reported decision passing directly on the
nature and effect of the procurement program. Other cases, discussed in
this article, evidence a concern with the procurement program.
4. It appears that the only published treatment of the program is: Comment,
Atomic Energy-UraniumProcurement-LegalAspects of the AEC Domestic Ore PurchaseProgram, 56 MIcH. L. REv. 786 (1958). The annual reports
of the Committee on Atomic Energy of the American Bar Association's
Section of Mineral and Natural Resources Low have considered some
procurement problems briefly and personnel of the Atomic Energy Commission have from time to time spoken on some of the problems related to
procurement. The general dearth of published material on the procurement
program is, however, surprising.
5. Comment, supra note 4.
6. Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, supra note 3.
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gram and the rights and duties of parties affected by the
program have become apparent.
Throughout the last twenty years, there have been hundreds of producers and sellers of uranium, but only one
significant buyer, the United States Atomic Energy Commission. The marketing scheme is basically the product of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946,' as amended in 1954,' and
the programs promulgated by the Atomic Energy Commission pursuant to these statutes.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the basic
plan for the development and marketing of domestic uranium
reserves. It provided that all source material, ' including
uranium and thorium, could be transferred, delivered and
possessed only pursuant to license from the Atomic Energy
Commission. The Act created the Atomic Energy Commission and gave it exclusive power to issue licenses and acquire
source material, and to establish guaranteed prices for source
material delivered to it within a specified time. Further,
the Commission was given authority to conduct exploratory
operations, investigations and inspections to determine the
location, extent and occurrence of source material. Section
5(b) (7) of the Act provided that all source materials contained in whatever concentration in public lands were reserved for the use of the United States, subject to valid
claims, rights or privileges existing as of August 1, 1947.
Thus, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 imposed, or gave
power to the Commission to impose, total control over the
exploration, development, production, sale and use of do
mestic uranium reserves.
In accordance with the mandate of the 1946 Act, the
Commission promulgated two important Circulars relating
to procurement of uranium ores. Circular No. 1, effective
midnight April 11, 1948, established a ten-year guaranteed
minimum price for domestic high grade uranium-bearing ores
7. 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
8. Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 921 (1954), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2394
(1964).
9. "Source material" means any material, except fissionable material, which
contains by weight one-twentieth of one per cent (0.05%) or more of (1)
uranium, (2) thorium, or (3) any combination thereof, 10 C.F.R. § 40.4(h)
(1963).
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and mechanical concentrates, other than ores of the Colorado
Plateau Area." The guaranteed minimum price was fixed
at $3.50 per pound of U 3 08" determined to be recoverable
from such uranium-bearing ores and mechanical concentrates, less the cost of refining to acceptable standards of
purity, and f.o.b. Commission designated shipping points.
The Circular requested offers from interested parties, which
offers, if meeting stated criteria, would result in contracts.
Although obviously designed to stimulate interest in prospecting, exploration and development of needed reserves,
the language of the Circular did not, on its face, rise to the
level of a clear offer. In Radium Mines, Inc. v. United
States, 2 however, the Court of Claims held that the Circular
constituted an enforceable offer to buy on the terms and
conditions stated therein.
Circular No. 31" established a three-year guaranteed minimum price for ores of the Colorado Plateau Area, the threeyear period expiring in 1951. Inasmuch as widespread exploration interest had already developed on the Colorado
Plateau and substantial known reserves existed, there was
apparently a belief that the Circular 3 program need not
extend so far into the future as the Circular I program.
Circular No. 1 was permitted to expire by its terms in
1958. Circular No. 3 was superseded by Circular No. 5, which
became a by-word in the uranium industry. Circular No. 5
guaranteed prices through March 31, 1958, and, as amended,
guaranteed prices through March 31, 1962. Circular No. 5,
as its predecessor Circular No. 3, related only to uraniumbearing ores of the Colorado Plateau Area. It established
base prices based on U 3 0 8 content, premiums, development
allowances and haulage allowances.
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 authorized sale to the
Commission of concentrate produced from uranium ores and
the negotiation of contracts between the Commission and private parties for the construction and operation of uranium
mills.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Domestic Uranium Circular No. 1, 13 Fed. Reg. 2089 (1948).
Uranium Oxide-the naturally-occurring form of uranium.
Radium Mines, Inc. v. United States, supra note 3.
Domestic Uranium Circular No. 3, 13 Fed. Reg. 2090 (1948).
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The enactment of the 1954 Act was followed by a public
announcement, on May 24, 1956, of a new uranium procurement program for the period from April 1, 1962, through
December 31, 1966.'" The announcement stated:
The U. S. Atomic Energy Commission today
announced establishment of a new domestic uranium
procurement program for the period from April 1,
1962, through December 31, 1966, and an extension
of the initial production bonus for uranium ore from
February 28, 1957, its present expiration date,
through March 31, 1960.
The new domestic procurement program provides a guaranteed market for all uranium concentrates produced by domestic mills from domestic
ores, subject to a limitation, at the Commission's
option, of 500 tons of U30 8 per year from any one
mining property or mining operation and to compliance with Commission specifications. The price
established is $8.00 per pound of U 3 0 8 contained in
normal mill concentrates or precipitates.
This action was taken in recognition of the
need for a continuing Government market in order
to maintain a high rate of exploration and development. Although domestic uranium production has
shown a remarkable expansion, known ore reserves
will be greatly depleted by 1962 unless extended by
aggressive development and exploration. A high
rate of discovery is essential if substantial prdduction is to be maintained after that date. The new
domestic uranium procurement program provides
assurance of a government market for an additional
period of almost five years beyond March 31, 1962.
This assurance will assist uranium mining and milling firms in planning future operations."5
The new program was, by its nature, designed to provide for
the purchase of concentrates from mills. It afforded no market for the raw ores of individual producers, except to the
extent the Commission would direct a particular mill to purchase from individual producers.
The Commission did, in its negotiations with mills, re14. U.S. AEC Release No. 830, May 24, 1956.
15. Ibid.
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quire commitment by such mills to purchase ores from specified producers. There is, however, no Commission circular
or announcement that defines what, if any, marketing rights
an individual producer has or had after the expiration of
Circulars 1, 3 and 5. As a practical matter, there was no
market for the low-grade uranium ores of Wyoming and
other areas until contracts had been concluded between the
Commission and private mills, and arrangements pursuant
to such contracts made between producers and mills.
To alleviate this problem, the Commission announced on
April 2, 1958, that it had taken action to expand domestic
uranium procurement to a limited extent." The announcement stated that the expansion would provide an additional
market for ore reserves developed prior to November 1, 1957.
The announcement further stated that a study by the Commission had indicated that five uranium areas-Southeast
Texas, North Dakota, South Dakota, Wyoming, Colorado
Front Range and Nevada (Austin)-had no local market,
or an inadequate market, for the output of mines with developed ore reserves. The April 2, 1958, announcement was followed by negotiations with private industry for the construction and operation of mills.
The April 2 announcement, however, was quickly followed by an announcement published November 24, 1958, announcing modification of the Commission's 1962-66 concentrate purchase program. 7 The November 24 announcement
confirmed that the Commission would carry out its May 24,
1956, commitment, but limited that commitment to ore reserves developed prior to November 24, 1958, in reliance
upon the May 24, 1956, announcement. The Commission
withdrew prospectively the concentrate purchase program
announced May 24, 1956, and stated that with respect to
new reserves developed after November 24, 1958, the Commission would make contracts to purchase concentrate only
to the extent that requirements might dictate, and only on
such terms and conditions and at such prices as the Commission might from time to time accept.
16. U.S. AEC Release No. 210, April 2, 1958.
17. U.S. AEC Release No. 220, November 24, 1958.
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The November 24, 1958, announcement was a disappointment to many prospectors and producers who had acted in
reliance upon the May 24, 1956, announcement. However,
the November 24, 1958, announcement was couched in language
that minimized criticism. One showing reliance upon the
May 24, 1956, announcement, and the establishment of reserves prior to November 24, 1958, was theoretically protected. In practice, however, protection did not always exist.
Some prospectors and property owners never succeeded in
satisfying the requirements of the November 24, 1958, announcement.
Significantly, the November 24, 1958, announcement contained a statement that "protection will be given independent
miners by incorporating in all new mill contracts and extensions to existing mll contracts provisions designed to provide
independent mine operators a fair share of available mill
capacities. ""
The problem of fixing standards for the determination
of ore reserves claimed to have been established as of November 24, 1958, was first articulated by John E. Patterson, Chief
of the Ore Resources Section, Grand Junction Operations
Office of the Commission, in an address to the Uranium
Institute of America on January 27, 1959.1" This address
set forth the criteria for determination of ore reserves.
On May 18, 1959, the Commission announced that data
on uranium ore reserves developed as of November 24, 1958,
were required to be submitted to the Commission before
August 1, 1959, by those who wished to be considered in
negotiations for uranium concentrate procurement for the
1962-66 period."0 The release also stated that several hundred
mine operators were being advised by letter of the cutoff date.
Formal notice of the cutoff date was published in the Federal
Register on May 18, 1959.21
On July 15, 1959, the Grand Junction Operations Office
of the Commission, by public announcement, directed atten18. Ibid.
19. Address by John E. Patterson before the Uranium Institute of America,
January 27, 1959.
20. U.S. AEC Release No. 235, May 18, 1959.
21. U.S. AEC Announcement, 24 Fed. Reg. 4040 (1959).
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tion to the fact that July 31, 1959, was the final date for
submission by operators of data on uranium ore reserves
developed as of November 24, 1958.22 The Commission offered its assistance in assembling such data. By announcement
dated August 14, 1959, the Commission announced that it
would accept for consideration uranium ore reserve data
received after July 31, 1959, and before October 1, 1959,
if in the opinion of the Commission the producer demonstrated reasonable justification for having failed to submit
such data before August 1, 1959. "
In most areas the Commission followed a strict practice
of establishing allocations" for the 1962-66 period by reference to ore reserves established prior to November 24, 1958.
The Commission recognized, however, that a large number
of mining operations involved irregular 'deposits that, under
normal mining procedures, are not developed far in advance
of mining. In these cases, the Commission determined to
use a historical production rate rather than developed ore
reserves as a basis for establishing the allocations. This practice was described at the hearings on development, growth
and state of the atomic energy industry before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Feruary 21, 1961.25 Most of
the properties for which the historical basis was considered
as an alternative to developed ore reserves were located in
the Uravan Mineral Belt.2" In these cases, the Commission
adopted a practice of establishing an allocation for a mining
property on a case by case basis, considering ore production
over the period July 1, 1956, to June 30, 1960. This practice
resulted in some lack of uniformity in treatment of producers,
not only as concerned different areas but also as concerned
producers within a particular area.
On June 29, 1962, the Commission announced that it
was relaxing production limitations on small domestic mining
properties having allocations of less than 20,000 pounds of
22. U.S. AEC Release No. 238, July 15, 1959.
23. U.S. AEC Release No. 243, August 14, 1959.
24. The term "allocation" has come to be used generally in the industry as
describing the quotas of concentrate saleable to the Commission based upon
the Commission determination of recognized ore reserves.
25. U.S. AEC Release No. 294, February 21, 1961.
26. Ibid. The Uravan Mineral Belt is located in the Colorado Plateau Area of
Southwestern Colorado.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss2/4

8

Lewis and Rooker: Domestic Uranium Procurement - History and Problems

1966

DOMESTIC URANIUM PROCUREMENT

457

U 3 0 8 in ore per year, and that it would permit mills to purchase, under ore purchase contracts approved by the Commission, up to 10,000 pounds of U 3 08 in ore from any such
small mining property unit in each six-month period before
January 1, 1967. An overall limitation of this program to
one million pounds per year was imposed. 7
On November 17, 1962, the Commission announced a
procurement program for the period from January 1, 1967,
through December 31, 1970." The Commission invited proposals from its contractors to defer delivery of a quantity
of concentrate, already contracted for 'delivery before 1967,
for delivery during the calendar years 1967 and 1968, and
the purchase by the Commission of an additional quantity
in 1969 and 1970 equal to the amount so deferred. This
program is known in the industry as the stretchout program.
The Commission did not deal 'directly with ore producers.
Without a mill proposal for stretchout, a producer was, for
practical purposes, precluded from stretchout. A producer
wishing to participate was required to have an ore sale
contract with a milling company approved by the Commission
under the November 24, 1958, announcement, and was required to have his proposed deferment incorporated in the
stretchout proposal submitted by the milling company to
the Commission.
Provision was also made in the November 17, 1962,
announcement for consolidation of producing mining property units" and of milling operations or milling contracts,
provided agreement could be reached with the Commission
for the proposed consolidation.
By announcement dated July 20, 1963, the Commission
has conclusively decreed that no mining claim located or
relocated under the mining laws of the United States as to
which notice of location or relocation was filed or recorded
after July 20, 1963, shall be considered by the Commission
as having ore reserves developed prior to the November 24,
1958, announcement in reliance upon the May 24, 1956, an27. U.S. AEC Release No. 350, June 29, 1962.
28. U.S. AEC Release No. 356, November 17, 1962.
29. 1bd.
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nouncement." Furthermore, no such mining claim will be
considered by the Commission as eligible for an allocation
by reason of a history of production of uranium ores. The
Commission may, however, recognize relocations accomplished for the purpose of perfecting or continuing possessory
rights to mining claims otherwise eligible for an allocation.
The most salient developments that have occurred with
respect to the Commission's procurement programs during
the past eight years have been, first, the shift from a raw
ore acquisition program to a program restricted to the
acquisition of concentrate, and second, the shift from the
open ended guaranteed price program under Circulars 1, 3
and 5 to procurement now governed exclusively by contracts
establishing the maximum purchase obligations of the Commission.
The first development, which has been a natural outgrowth of the authority to acquire concentrate conferred upon
the Commission by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, has given
rise to what was for some time a recurring problem between
operators and royalty owners. Typically, the pre-1954 agreement between the operator and the owner contemplated payment of a royalty equal to a percentage of "net mill returns,"
''net smelter returns'' or some amount described semantically. Some royalty owners have contended that they are
entitled to have their royalty computed on the basis of returns
from the sale of concentrate without deduction for the cost
of milling the raw ore for the production of concentrate. The
milling companies, on the other hand, have argued that the
royalties should be predicted either on the market value of
the raw ore or on the sale price of the concentrate less reasonable milling charges.
The second development has given rise to a potentially
serious problem involving the Commission, the operator controlling properties, and other persons having an interest in
such properties. The nature of the allocation approved by
30. U.S. AEC Release No. 378, July 20, 1963.
31. "Net mill returns" and "net smelter returns" arc terms, the meanings of
which are quite well defined by usage in the hard-rock mining industry.
Frequently, however, agreements in the uranium industry have employed
less recognized formulations.
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the Commission with respect to a particular property unit
has never been defined. It may, therefore, be unclear whether
the allocation is a property right that inures to the benefit
of the owner of the property, and to the operator only so
long as he controls the property, or whether the allocation
is a personal right belonging to the operator of the property
who 'discovered, developed and reported the reserves upon
which it is predicated. Indeed, it is not altogether clear that
the allocation is a right at all, since there may be some basis
for concluding that it is merely a privilege granted by the
Commission, which may be altered or eliminated more or
less at will. Thus, the problem is to characterize and define
the allocation itself and to arrive at some conclusion as to
who is entitled to claim ownership of it and what rights
accrue to the owner.
TRE NATUE oF T iE ALLOCATON

The maximum purchase obligations of the Commission,
effective in some cases through 1966 and in other cases
through 1970 by reason of stretchout contracts are known
as allocations. Allocations are commonly expressed in terms
of pounds of U 3 0 8 saleable to the Commission under a described contract during a stated period-typically a Commission fiscal year. Allocations were originally fixed by the
Commission based upon ore reserve data submitted by the
property owners or operators to the Commission, and independent analysis of the property unit by the Commission
staff. Once the determination was made with respect to a
particular property unit, the allocation was typically established by an "allocation letter" from the Commission to the
operator. These letters established allocations effective
through December 31, 1966.
It appears that operators were free to 'determine for
themselves what properties should be included in a single
unit, and, therefore, accorded a single allocation. Thus, an
operator might, for example, having been granted an allocation of 500,000 pounds of U 3 0 8 per Commission fiscal year
on a single property unit include lands owned in fee simple
by the operator, lands held by the operator under a determinable contract of sale, lands held under lease, lands held
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1966
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under a bare operating agreement, unpatented mining claims
owned by the operator, such claims held under contract or
lease, and such claims held under operating agreement, as
well as lands and unpatented claims subject to outstanding
royalty interests by reason of many different kinds of agreements. The allocation established with respect to the property unit was gross, without any indication whatever of the
extent to which the allocation might have been based upon
reserves reported by the operator or recognized by the Commission on different parts of the property unit.
Once the allocation had been established, it was unclear
what result would obtain if the operator should lose control
of one of the included properties, as, for example, by the
involuntary termination of an operating right. If the allocation is regarded as being a personal right of the operator,
then it should follow that loss of the property would not
adversely affect the allocation. If, on the other hand, the
allocation is regarded as being tied to reserves established
and recognized on certain specific properties included in the
unit, then the loss of such a property might be claimed to
be a basis for a reduction of the operator's allocation. If
such a reduction were to take place, it has been argued that
the allocation tied to the lost property should pass with the
property to the persons in control of the property. So far
as we are aware, these questions have not been clearly resolved.
Many such owners of underlying interests have been
concerned about their claim to a share of the aggregate allocation afforded a property unit. For example, it appears
that Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Vitro Minerals Corp. 2 was
precipitated to a large extent by the plaintiff's claim that
the defendant had secured an allocation on a property unit
including properties owned by the plaintiff, and held by the
defendant under lease, and was using the allocation for the
sale of ores derived from other properties in the unit, even
though the plaintiff asserted that reserves established on
its properties provided a substantial part of the basis for
the allocation to the unit. This action was pending at the
time the defendant sold and assigned its interest in all of
82.

386 P.2d 938 (Wyo. 1963).
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its Wyoming uranium properties and ore sale agreements
to Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners. After acquisitions
of these properties, Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners
initiated negotiations with the Commission to enter into a
stretchout contract covering these and other properties and,
as a part of that contract, to consolidate these properties with
other properties owned and controlled by the Partnership.
Shoni Uranium Corporation again manifested its concern
over what it characterized as an effort to use "its" allocation
for the mining of other properties, by objecting strenuously
to the consolidation proposal. Shoni initiated an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming" seeking to enjoin Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners and the Commission from entering into the proposed
consolidation and stretchout agreement. The action was dismissed without a decision on the merits.
The Commission has now concluded all stretchout contracts based upon proposals made pursuant to its announcement of November 17, 1962. Some of these contracts, as
has been noted, include consolidation provisions. All allocations not extended by inclusion in stretchout contracts will,
of course, expire on December 31, 1966. Therefore, future
questions concerning the nature and effects of the allocation,
and the rights flowing to the holder of the allocation, must
now be viewed in the light of the provisions of the stretchout
contracts.
There are many provisions in the stretchout contracts
bearing upon the nature and effect of the allocation. The
contracts prohibit the milling company from producing concentrate in excess of the allocated amounts saleable to the
Commission under the contracts unless excess production is
sold to purchasers licensed by the Commission. The contracts
prohibit sale or delivery of concentrate to or processing of
ores by any person other than the named contractor, as to
ores and concentrates 'derived from properties that are the
subject of the particular contract, without the prior written
approval of the Commission. The penalty for any violative
8.

The Shoni Corp. v. Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners, Civil No. 4,819,
D. Wyo.
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sale or delivery, or processing, is a reduction in allocation
equal to the quantity of ore or concentrate improperly sold,
delivered or processed. The contracts prohibit the processing
in the contractor's plant for delivery to the Commission prior
to January 1, 1969, of any ores except from the properties
particularly described in the contract. On January 1, 1969,
other properties that have not participated in a deferral of
allocation under the stretchout announcement may become
eligible for the production of ores to be processed and sold
to the Commission.' The Commission is empowered under
the contracts to compel the contractor to acquire and process
for delivery to the Commission ores from properties other
than those described in the contract, subject to an annual
maximum and a pro-rata monthly limit. The contractor itself,
with Commission approval, may acquire and process for
delivery to the Commission ores from properties other than
those described in the contract, in which event the new properties are added to the contract.
The effect of the foregoing provisions is to permit rigid
Commission control over the production and processing of
uranium. As a practical matter, the contractor is limited to
production of the amount of the allocations established for
properties included in his milling contract, and all of such
production must come from the property units for which the
allocations have been established.
It has been accepted, both as a matter of theory and
practice, since the allocation concept was born in 1958, that
an operator controlling a property unit having a gross allocation could produce any part or all of his allocation from
any one or more of the properties contained in the unit. The
practice that has obtained following the consummation of
stretchout and consolidation contracts confirms this fact.
That is, where a stretchout and consolidation contract has
consolidated previously separate property units into a single
property unit, and the allocations in respect of those units
into a single allocation, the operator of the consolidated unit
has been and is free to produce any part or all of the aggregate
consolidated allocation from any one or more of the pro34. Release, op. cit. eupra note 28.
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perties contained within the consolidated property unit. This
fact is obviously inconsistent with any concept that would
tie the allocation, or any part of it, to a particular property
in the unit, rather than to the unit as a whole. Such a concept
would require the operator to produce the allocation pro-rata
from the various properties contained within the unit. This
has never been the practice.
The negotiation of stretchout and consolidation contracts
entailed a re-examination by the Commission staff of existing
allocations, since consolidation was limited to existing allocations economically produceable by December 31, 1966, from
original property units. In negotiating consolidation the
Commission may have determined that no reserves at all on
property "A" could be produced economically, but that twice
the original reserves on property "B" could be mined economically. On this basis, the allocation recognized in consolidation would remain unchanged, but would be now predicated
only upon properties " B" and "C" rather than equally upon
,properties "A," "B" and "C."
The stretchout contracts indicate in another manner the
character of the allocation. The effect of the stretchout
contract is to commit the contractor to defer for delivery in
1967 and 1968 a quantity of concentrate otherwise deliverable
in the pre-1967 period. In exchange for this commitment, the
contracts obligate the Commission to purchase, in 1969 and
1970, an additional quantity of concentrate equal to the
amount deferred and delivered in 1967 and 1968.
The allocations for 1967 and 1968 must be produced
from the properties expressly described in the contracts.
The 1969 and 1970 allocations, however, may be produced
either from these or from any other property, excepting
only properties controlled by another producer that were
eligible in the pre-1969 period under other stretchout contracts.
The 1969-70 allocations are, of course, based solely upon
the deferrals to and deliveries in 1967-68. These deferrals
and deliveries, in turn, are based upon allocations established
upon the basis of November 24, 1958, reserves, subject to
changes in these allocations occurring due to consolidation.
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1966
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Thus, if the original allocation to a property unit is to be
tied pro-rata to the properties in the unit, then 1969-70 allocations based on the original allocation would appear to be
equally bound to the properties.
As has been noted, this is not the case, since in the 1969-70
period other properties, not included in the unit, become
eligible for production of the allocation.
There is, finally, the very practical problem of the operator who controls the property unit comprised of many separate properties. Many of the included properties may contain reserves. These reserves will, of course, be of different
quantities and qualities. The prudent operator is bound to
produce first those reserves that can be produced most
economically. Thus, the recognized right of an operator to
produce all or any part of his allocation from any property
contained in a property unit is predicated on the most realistic and logical needs of the mining industry.
It seems clear that the allocation constitutes a personal
right of the operator useable as he may determine so long
as such use complies with standards established by the Commission-a right that cannot under the milling contracts
pass to the holder of a remainder or reversionary interest
in the event of loss of the property by the operator.
To the extent that the Commission may endeavor to
modify the allocation rights of an operator or owner, serious
questions may arise. Certainly there appears to be no basis
for the claim that the Commission had such power before the
consummation of the stretchout contracts. It must be remembered, however, that in the absence of a stretchout contract,
the independent producers allocation would expire on December 31, 1966. The Commission requires that before the property of any independent producer can be subject to the
stretchout contract, the consent of the independent producer
must be obtained. This consent would itself constitute an
acquiescence in the provisions of the stretchout contract, including those provisions empowering the Commission to
adjust or modify the allocation of the independent producer.
Again, however, if the contractual provisions are effective
to give this broad power to the Commission, it is imperative
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss2/4
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that the Commission exercise the power reasonably and in
conformity to appropriate standards of fair play.3 5
COMPUTATION OF ROYALTY

Numerous royalty owners have contended that their
royalties should be computed on the basis of concentrate
selling price without deduction for the costs of milling. These
claims have been the subject of two important cases in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit "
and the Supreme Court of Utah"7 have held that royalties
are to be computed upon the selling price or value of raw
ore rather than on the selling price of concentrate without
deduction for milling costs. For economy in presentation,
this article will be limited to a detailed analysis of the Richardson case. Rimledge involved similar facts.
In Richardson, the royalty owners held a 15% royalty
interest, which was defined by the Lease and Agreement
between the parties as "a royalty of fifteen per cent of the
gross value of the ores, minerals and metals extracted ....""
The term "gross value" was defined as the "net returns
derived from the sales of ores, minerals, and metals extracted
and removed from the claims, excluding development and
haulage allowances, but including premiums and bonuses
other than the development and haulage allowances."" The
properties that were the subject of the Richardson case had
been mined before the Commission, in 1957, established programs permitting the sale of concentrate rather than raw
ore. Accordingly, the plaintiff royalty owners acknowledged
that as to ore sold before that time, they had received the
full royalty to which they were entitled based upon the selling
price of the raw ore sold. In 1957, the defendant Homestake
Mining Company entered into a Custom Milling Agreement
35. Section 3(a) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act provides: "No
person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not . . .published [in the Federal Register]." 60 Stat. 238 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (1964). To the extent that the Commission might attempt
to modify existing allocations upon the basis of its unpublished "allocation
procedures," such attempts would probably be rendered ineffective by this
provision.
36. Richardson v. Homestake Mining Co., 322 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1963).
87. Rimledge Uranium & Mining Corp. v. Federal Resources Corp., 374 P.2d
20 (Utah 1962).
88. Richardson v. Homestake Mining Co., supra note 36, at 329.

89. Ibid.
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and a Concentrate Purchase Agreement with Uranium Reduction Company, the operator of a mill at Moab, Utah.
Under these agreements, Uranium Reduction Company agreed
to process and mill ores delivered by Homestake and to purchase the concentrate after completion of the milling process.
The record established in Richardson that the amount agreed
to be paid to Homestake on the purchase of concentrate, less
the custom milling charges applicable under the Custom Milling Agreement were exactly equal to the amount that Homestake would have realized on the sale of raw ore under Circular
5, Revised, which was applicable to the properties in question
situated in the Colorado Plateau area.
Based upon this record, and upon the Rimledge case and
other authorities," the Court of Appeals concluded that the
royalty agreement was intended to provide for a royalty
based upon the value of raw ore rather than the sale price
of concentrate without deduction for milling charges.
There is reason to believe that royalty agreements formulated since the Richardson and Rimledge cases were decided have generally dealt specifically with the issues litigated
in those cases so as to preclude any claim that royalties under
such agreements should be determined on the basis of concentrate selling price without deduction for milling charges.
There are, of course, many instruments still in effect that
were drawn before the problem disposed of by Richardson
and Rimledge became generally known. Accordingly, these
cases provide sound authority for the interpretation of such
pre-existing royalty agreements and, it is hoped, will forestall
further litigation concerning the question.
40. Nevada Half Moon Mining Co. v. Combined Metals Reduction Co., 176 F.2d
73 (10th Cir. 1949); cf., Coyle v. Louisiana Gas & Fuel Co., 175 La. 990,
144 So. 737 (1932) ; Crichton v. Standard Oil Co., 178 La. 57, 150 So. 668
(1933); Freeland v. Sun Oil Co., 184 F. Supp 754 (W.D. La. 1959), a!f'd,
277 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1960); Ladd v. Upham, 128 Tex. 14, 58 S.W.2d 1037
(1933), aff'd, 95 S.W.2d 365 (1936); Matzen v. Hugoton Prod. Co., 182
Kan. 456, 321 P.2d 576 (1958) ; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ochsner, 146 F.2d
138 (5th Cir. 1944); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Record, 146 F.2d 485 (5th
Cir. 1944); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 158 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1946);
Vedder Petroleum Corp. v. Lambert Lands Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 102, 122 P.2d
600 (1942); Wall v. United Gas Public Service Co., 178 La. 908, 152 So. 561
(1934); Warfield Natural Gas Co. v. Allen, 261 Ky. 840, 88 S.W.2d 989
(1935); Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 257,
206 P.2d 643 (1949).
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OTHER ISSUES
There are other issues that have become apparent in connection with the Commission's procurement program. Depending upon one's view of the nature of the allocation, the
existence of an allocation might be thought to have an impact
upon the duty owed by an operator to explore, 'develop and
produce diligently a uranium mining property. There is also
the problem of determining the price to be paid by the Commission for concentrate purchased in 1969 and 1970. The
possible existence of claims against the Commission for refusal
to purchase materials from ore reserves not recognized by
the Commission, but claimed to have been established prior
to November 24, 1958, may still be a problem, although it
would appear that the statutes of limitations may have laid
this issue to rest." The first two of these problems will be
treated briefly below.
A. The Allocation and the Duty to Operate Diligently
The duty of one who holds a mining property, subject
to outstanding interests in their persons, as in the case of a
lease, determinable contract, operating agreement or royalty
agreement, to operate the property diligently, so as to maximize the value of the property, and the return to other interest holders, is well-recognized.4 2 Such a duty may be imposed
by the express terms of the instrument-contract, lease or
deed-governing the relationship between the operator and
the owners of the underlying interests. In the absence of an
express duty, such a duty will be implied, unless negated by
the terms of the instrument."
41. See note 14 mipra and accompanying text. Any such claim would be predicated on reliance upon the Commission's announcement of May 24, 1956.
If the doctrine of the Radium Mines case, supra note 3, is applicable to
that announcement, as it appears clearly to be, the announcement constituted
an offer. The offer, if such it was, was withdrawn, or limited, by the Commission's announcement of November 24, 1958. See supra note 17. It is
doubtful that any events occurring after Ncvember 24, 1958, could be
relied upon in asserting a claim against the Commission except a later
refusal by the Commission to recognize claimed reserves supported by a
timely submission of reserve data. In any event, it is doubtful that any claim
could have accrued less than six years ago, which indicates the high degree
of probability, that such claims are barred by limitations.
42. Carter v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 213 La. 1028, 36 So. 2d 26 (1948);
Freeport Sulphur Co. v. American Sulphur Ruyalty Co., 117 Tex. 439, 6
S.W.2d 1039 (1928) ; Watson Land Co. v. Rio Grande Oil Co., 61 Cal.App. 2d
269, 142 P.2d 950 (1943).
43. Fox Petroleum Co. v. Booker, 123 Okla. 276, 253 Pac. 33 (1926) ; Carter v.
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., supra note 42; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co.,
140 Fed. 801 (8th Cir. 1905).
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The market limitations imposed by the allocation system
accentuate the duty to operate diligently. For example, the
owner of a uranium property that is leased to an operator
who controls a property unit, including the leased property,
with an established allocation, is understandably anxious
that his property be produced so that he will share in the
allocation." He may be fearful that a private market for
uranium may never develop, in which case the reserves contained in his property will, he thinks, be valueless after the
allocation expires. Against this concern must be balanced
the desire of the operator, dictated by prudence, to mine the
most economical reserves first.
If the allocation afforded a property unit were regarded
as tied pro rata to the properties comprising the unit, the
owner could contend persuasively that the operator had a
duty to mine a particular property and use that property's
pro rata share of the allocation. As has been noted, however,
the allocation to the property unit plainly is not tied pro rata
to the properties in the unit. Thus, the operator's right to
produce any part or all of the unit allocation from any one
or more of the properties in the unit is consistent with the
operator's need, and duty, to produce first from the most
economical reserves. The existence of an allocation for a
property unit including a leased property therefore cannot
properly be regarded as having any effect on the lessee's
duty to operate diligently. Only if the allocation is for the
specific property can the existence of the allocation be regarded as affecting the duty to operate diligently.
B. The 1969-70 Concentrate Purchase Price
The Commission's announcement of November 17, 1962,
and stretchout contracts concluded as contemplated by that
announcement, obligate the Commission to purchase in 1969
and 1970 an amount of concentrate equal to that deferred by
the contractor and delivered in 1967 and 1968. The 1967-68
price is the same as would have been paid for the deferred
concentrate, had it been delivered in the pre-1967 period
44. See, e.g., Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Vitro Minerals Corp., 386 P.2d 938 (Wyo.
1968); Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Federal-Radorock Gas Hills Partners, eupra

note 88.
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under former contracts. The per pound concentrate purchase
price applicable in 1969 and 1970, however, is a lesser amount,
equal to 85 per cent of average allowable production costs
per pound incurred during the period January 1, 1963,
through December 31, 1968, but not to exceed $6.70 per pound.
The stretchout contracts contain detailed and complex
provisions for 'determining such average allowable production costs. These provisions attempt to specify in great
detail those costs that are and those costs that are not allowable. The Committee on Atomic Energy of the American
Bar Association Section of Mineral and Natural Resources
Law noted one of the most difficult problems in its 1965
report:
The accounting procedures, among other things, limit
development costs so that to the extent there are
remaining reserves as of January 1, 1969, benefiting
from such development costs, those attributable to
the base cost period must be reduced proportionately
taking into account the remaining reserves. There
are indications that this may become a particularly
acute problem with respect to underground mining
operations and development costs incurred in connection with the digging of a shaft inasmuch as the
reserves that remain at January 1, 1969, will depend
upon the appropriate definition of the mining unit
being serviced by the particular shaft. The proposed mining unit for this purpose must be submitted to and approved by the Commission staff.
There are indications that the mining operators and
Commission staff may disagree as to the components
of such mining units with the staff seeking to expand such mining units and the contractor seeking
to keep them as small as possible.4
These and other problems that will undoubtedly arise
in the interpretation and application of the stretchout contract provisions governing the 1969-70 concentrate purchase
price determination will be difficult to resolve. It is doubtful, however, that these problems will be litigated. It is more
likely that they will be worked out by negotiation between
the Commission and its contractors.
45. A.B.A. SEcT. M. & N.R.L., CoMm. REP. 2 (1965).
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CONCLUSION

It is remarkable that a Government program that is as
far-reaching and rigidly-controlled as is the uranium procurement program, and that involves the huge sums of money
that this program involves, can be as free as this program
has been from litigation. There have sometimes been predictions that the number of disputes would increase for one
reason or another. Such predictions, however, have not been
fulfilled, and such disputes as have arisen, particularly those
between the Commission and its contractors, have for the
most part been resolved by negotiations between the interested
parties.
If this history were not credited, there might now be
occasion for further prediction of future disputes and litigation. However, there is no reason to believe that future
problems will be more difficult to solve or will be solved in
different ways from problems that have arisen in the past.
As has been seen, the procurement program entails some
potential issues-notably that of characterizing and giving
form and substance to the allocation concept-that have not
been conclusively resolved. It may be that these problems
are of sufficient severity that litigation will be required to
resolve them. If a court should be called upon to determine
whether the allocation constitutes a personal right of the
operator, rather than an interest that "runs with the land,"
it is submitted that the history and practice of the allocation
program require the conclusion that the allocation is tied
only to the entire property unit, and does not pass "piece
a piece" on an unknown and indeterminable basis with parts
of the unit. It follows from this conclusion that the existence
of an allocation for a property unit cannot have any effect
on the operator's duty to the owner of an interest in a single
property included in the unit.
The law on computation of royalty ,payments appears
to be settled. Time either has or shortly will conclude the
possibility of claims against the Commission based on the
pre-November 24, 1958, programs. The resolution of ambiguities and conflicts in the procedures and standards for determining the 1969-70 concentrate purchase prices will most
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol1/iss2/4
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likely be resolved, more or less peacefully, by negotiation.
On the whole, and despite the several difficult issues
facing parties interested in the Commission's procurement
program, it seems likely that the relative peace of the past
will continue in the future, and that the resolution of these
issues, if passed, will not be difficult if the evolutionary history of the procurement program is examined carefully, and
its lessons are accepted.
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